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Abstract
Most working-age Americans obtain health insurance through the workplace. U.S. law
requires employers to use a common price, but the value of insurance varies with idiosyncratic
health risk. Hence, linking employment and health insurance creates a wedge between the
marginal cost and beneﬁt of insurance. We study the impact of this wedge on occupational
choice and welfare in a general equilibrium model. Agents face idiosyncratic health expen-
diture shocks, have heterogeneous managerial and worker productivity, and choose whether
to be workers or entrepreneurs. First, we consider a private insurance indemnity policy that
removes the link between employment and health insurance, so only ability matters for oc-
cupational choice. By construction, this is the most eﬃcient policy. We ﬁnd a welfare gain
of 2.28% from decoupling health insurance and employment. Second, we tighten the link by
increasing employment-based health insurance from the current level of 62% to 100%, and
ﬁnd a welfare loss of - 0.61%.
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1 Introduction
The U.S. health insurance system has two distinctive features: First, most working-age Americans
obtain health insurance coverage through the workplace, known as employment-based health in-
surance (EHI). Second, U.S. law requires employers that oﬀer health plans to use a price common
to all employees. When health insurance is linked to employment, occupational misallocation
may occur: Some individuals with high managerial ability but adverse health risks might choose
to become workers rather than entrepreneurs, and some individuals with moderate managerial
talent but good health might choose to run a ﬁrm rather than become a worker. This misalloca-
tion aﬀects more than just the individuals involved because entrepreneurs create jobs. Antunes,
Cavalcanti and Villamil (2008a) show that in the absence of health shocks, funding a smaller
number of highly talented entrepreneurs to run large ﬁrms may lead to higher earnings and
output, making both entrepreneurs and workers better oﬀ. The main result of this paper is
to quantify the misallocation associated with employment-based health insurance, which arises
from distortions in occupational choice and ﬁrm size.
To accomplish our goals, we construct a general equilibrium model of occupational choice
with heterogeneous agents and a credit market. Individuals are risk averse, live for many pe-
riods, and choose to either operate a ﬁrm and employ others or become a worker. Wages are
determined endogenously and healthcare policy is given. The government maintains a balanced
budget and uses lump sum taxes to pay for the beneﬁts it provides. There are four sources of
heterogeneity: managerial ability, worker productivity, health shocks, and assets. Diﬀerences in
ability correspond to the standard Lucas (1978) span of control talent to manage a ﬁrm and
worker productivity. As in Jeske and Kitao (2009), Fang and Gavazza (2011), Aizawa and Fang
(2013) and Feng and Zhao (2014), we use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to measure the
Markov process governing health shocks.1 Agents' assets evolve endogenously based on idiosyn-
cratic factors; speciﬁcally, their initial assets, productivities as workers or managers, and health
expenditure shocks.
We calibrate the model to the U.S., where on average 62% of workers get health insurance
through their employers. In order to focus on the amount of misallocation associated with EHI,
we conduct two policy experiments. First, we abolish EHI and provide all individuals with the
opportunity to purchase actuarially fair private indemnity insurance under which the insurance
provider agrees to pay for health expenditures incurred by the individual. The policy resembles
a contingent claim and is eﬃcient by design. Second, we extend EHI from the current 62% to
100% by requiring all employers to oﬀer health insurance. Relative to the U.S. baseline, these two
policies are polar extremes. For the indemnity policy, we ﬁnd that decoupling health insurance
1These papers focus on other issues. Jeske and Kitao (2009) examine U.S. healthcare subsidies and show that
the tax is regressive. Fang and Gavazza (2011) construct a life cycle model of medical expenditure and ﬁnd that
EHI leads to dynamically ineﬃcient investment in health. Aizawa and Fang (2013) develop a labor search model
and use it to examine the ACA, with particular focus on the policy's eﬀect on the uninsured rate. Feng and Zhao
(2014) study the impact of health policy on labor supply decisions.
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from employment would lead to a welfare gain of 2.28%. For the policy where we expand EHI
to all ﬁrms, we ﬁnd a welfare loss  0.61%. To our knowledge, such EHI induced distortions on
the macroeconomy have not been examined previously.
In general, the value of health insurance to risk-averse agents varies with their idiosyncratic
health risk. In a market without frictions, compensation reﬂects individual ability and exogenous
shocks, with marginal utility equalized across workers. Our model shows that when health
insurance is linked to employment, this creates a wedge between the marginal cost and beneﬁt of
insurance. Since health risk can be sizable and insurance is part of total employee compensation,
this wedge distorts ﬁrm and employee decisions. We use this model to assess the quantitative
impact of occupational misallocation.
The literature on health policy, and ﬁrm and employee decisions, is large. For example,
Garthwaite, Gross and Notowidigdo (2014) examine the eﬀect of employer-sponsored health
insurance in creating employment locks where agents pursue full-time jobs primarily to secure
health insurance. Their focus is on the eﬀect of health insurance on labor supply and they ﬁnd
microeconometric results consistent with a signiﬁcant employment lock.2 In contrast, Fairlie,
Kapur and Gates (2011) focus on entrepreneur locks and examine whether the U.S. EHI system
impedes business creation. Using innovative econometric methods, they ﬁnd a negative eﬀect
of having a spouse without insurance for business creation and that business ownership rates
increase at age 65 when individuals qualify for Medicare. We examine another aspect of an
entrepreneur/worker lock with diﬀerent methods. Using a general equilibrium model calibrated
to U.S. data, we quantify the eﬀects of occupational misallocation due to EHI on macroeconomic
variables such as output, the distribution of ﬁrm sizes, earnings and welfare.
Our paper also contributes to a broad literature that studies macroeconomic aspects of health
policies. This literature originates from Grossman (1972) and includes Brugemann and Manovskii
(2010), Cole, Kim and Kruger (2014), Feng and Zhao (2014), French and Jones (2004), Hansen,
Hsu and Lee (2014), Hall and Jones (2007), Jeske and Kitao (2009), Braun, Kopecky and Kore-
shkova (2015), Pashchenko and Porapkkam (2012), among others. Our paper is most related to
Jeske and Kitao (2009), who show that EHI subsidies constitute a regressive tax, and Cole, Kim
and Krueger (2014) who study labor and health insurance market mandates but focus on static
insurance gains versus dynamic incentive costs when eﬀort can improve health.
In order to focus on EHI characteristics that can distort private agents' occupational choice,
we incorporate health risk and health insurance into a Lucas (1978) span of control model.
Hence, our paper is related to the literature on entrepreneurship. For example, Antunes, Caval-
canti and Villamil (2008a) study the eﬀect of credit market frictions on entrepreneurship. Cagetti
and De Nardi (2006), Guner, Ventura and Xu (2008), Kitao (2008), Panousi (2008), and Li (2002)
focus on the impact of government policies related to capital accumulation on entrepreneurship.
Instead, this paper investigates the impact of a labor market friction on entrepreneurship. The
2Kolstad and Kowalski (2014) also use microeconometric techniques to examine an employer mandate and
labor supply.
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paper is also related to a large literature examining the causes and implications of factor misallo-
cation. See Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) and the articles therein. Our work complements this
literature by identifying a new friction associated with linking health insurance to employment,
which leads to occupational misallocation.
In summary, in order to analyze occupational misallocation our model has the following
key features. Individuals are endowed with heterogeneous managerial talent and heterogeneous
health shocks. Firms face diﬀerent costs of administering insurance that depend on their size.
Contracts are incomplete: wages cannot be conditioned on health shocks by law. Section 2
summarizes stylized facts about the U.S. health insurance system. Section 3 builds a model
consistent with these facts. Section 4 describes optimal behavior and the equilibrium. Section 5
contains the model calibration and the quantitative analysis is in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 U.S. Health Insurance Facts
We begin by summarizing some facts about the U.S. health insurance system that we wish our
model to be consistent with.
Fact 1: U.S. health expenditure is high relative to OECD countries.3
Figure 1 shows that in 2012 the U.S. spent 17.9% of GDP on health, about twice the OECD
average.
Fact 2: In contrast to most countries, the U.S. health insurance system is employment based.
In the U.S. over 90% of private health insurance coverage is employment based. Buchmueller
and Monheit (2009) discuss two government decisions that cemented the link between employ-
ment and health insurance: (i) During World War II the U.S. imposed wage and price controls,
and in 1943 the War Labor Board ruled that the controls did not apply to fringe beneﬁts such
as health insurance. Many employers used insurance beneﬁts to attract and retain workers. (ii)
In 1954 the Internal Revenue Service ruled that health insurance premiums paid by employers
were exempt from income taxation, providing a subsidy to EHI through the U.S. tax code.
Fact 3: The probability that a ﬁrm oﬀers EHI increases with ﬁrm size and administrative costs
of providing insurance decline with ﬁrm size.
3The ﬁgure was produced by Veronique de Rugy, Mercatus Center at George Mason University based on OECD
Health Data 2013. The OECD reports total health expenditure as a fraction of GDP, which is the sum of public
and private health spending. The measure includes health services (preventive and curative), family planning
activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health, but does not include provision of water
and sanitation. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS
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Figure 1: Health expenditure in OECD countries, 1970-2012
Figure 2 shows that EHI is strongly correlated with ﬁrm size and oﬀer rates are fairly stable
over time. About 97% of ﬁrms with over 100 employees oﬀer health insurance, about 80% of
ﬁrms with 25-99 employees oﬀer insurance, and only 40% of ﬁrms with less than 25 employees
oﬀer coverage. The Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality (AHRQ) compiles the probability
that a private ﬁrm in a given size bin oﬀers health insurance, where size is measured by the
number of employees. The AHRQ uses Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), Insurance
Component, private sector establishment data to compute this probability, pE(n).
4 The average
probability that a ﬁrm oﬀers insurance is 62%. The table also reports the administrative cost
of providing health insurance. Swartz (2006) shows that the cost savings from administrative
economies of scale and better risk pooling increase with group size. Premiums are based on two
components: average expected medical expenses for people in the group and a loading fee.
Expected medical expenses are the same regardless of whether the person is in a large or small
group, but the loading fee falls as size increases for three reasons: eﬃciencies in administration
and marketing, lower risk of adverse selection in a bigger pool, and lower risk that a fraction of
individuals will have very high costs. We denote this administrative cost by g(n) and construct
the function using data from the Small Business Administration, SBA (2011, p.38). The table
reports pE(n) and g(n) by ﬁrm employment size:
Firm size (j bins) n < 10 10− 24 25− 99 100− 999 n > 1000
pE(n) 0.336 0.625 0.816 0.943 0.992
Administrative cost, g(n) 0.3 0.21 0.132 0.0849 0.06
4See Exhibit 1.2, Percentage of private-sector employees in establishments that oﬀer health insurance, by
detailed ﬁrm size, 2003-2014, p. 37, http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/survey_comp/MEPSICChartbook.pdf
5
Figure 2: EHI oﬀer rate by establishment size, MEPS data
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Fact 4: The share of premiums paid by employers is approximately constant over time, av-
eraging about 85 percent for individual coverage and 75 percent for family coverage.5
Fact 5: Employment based health insurance has a premium based on a community rating.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), amended by the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), requires employers to oﬀer health
plans at common prices to all employees. The common price is known as community rating, where
insurers evaluate risk factors of a market population rather than an individual. In contrast, pri-
vate health insurance is generally based on individual characteristics and is more expensive than
employment based (group) insurance. Community ratings are one way to address a fundamental
market incompleteness that arises, for example, because individuals cannot choose their genes.
Adjusted community ratings permit lifestyle factors such as smoking status to be considered.
Interviews conducted by the Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute with large employers indi-
cate that EHI remains a valuable tool in recruiting and retaining workers. The percentage of
ﬁrms oﬀering health insurance as an employee beneﬁt has remained remarkably stable over time.
3 The Model: Economic Environment
Consider a Lucas (1978) span of control model, where individuals diﬀer in the ability to manage
capital and labor. Managerial productivity xi for each agent i is drawn from a common continuous
cumulative probability distribution with x ∈ [0,∞). Productivity is not hereditary and is publicly
observed. Households receive an idiosyncratic labor productivity shock z that indicates the
5See p. 6, https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/8625-2014-chartpack2.pdf
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eﬃciency units per unit of work hours. They also face an idiosyncratic health expenditure shock
mit, which follows a ﬁnite-state Markov process. For notational convenience, we drop agent
superscript i and time subscript t whenever possible; χ′ denotes the future value of a variable χ.
We will show that two types of individuals emerge, workers and entrepreneurs. We provide
the intuition for, and then derive, a critical productivity value, x∗. Individuals above this value
choose to be entrepreneurs and those below it are workers, ceteris paribus.
3.1 Preferences, endowments and technology
Preferences: Consumption by an agent in period t is ct, with utility given by U(ct).
Endowments: Each individual faces either a managerial productivity shock as an entrepreneur,
x, or a productivity shock as a worker, z. The distributions and realizations are public informa-
tion. All agents also receive an idiosyncratic medical spending shock m, which is unobservable.
Agents are endowed with an initial capital asset, a0, which can be used as an input in production.
Production: Firms use eﬃciency labor (n) and capital (k) to produce a single consumption
good, y. Eﬃciency labor is n =
∫
znˆ, the sum of hours worked, nˆ, weighted by the productivity
of each worker, z. Capital depreciates at a constant rate of δ. Managers can operate only one
project. The functional form of the production function is:
y = Xkαnγ where α, γ > 0. (1)
Managerial talent is given by X = x1−(α+γ).
Factor remuneration: Firms rent capital at the common market rate r(1 + ∆), where r is
the risk-free rate and ∆ ≥ 0. We assume that the intermediary charges a proportional cost ∆
per unit of funds loaned to the ﬁrm. As usual, this wedge above the risk-free rate accounts for
intermediation costs and a risk premium.
We wish our model to be consistent with the employment-based health insurance (EHI)
system in the United States, which we take as given. The ﬁrm oﬀers a worker a compensation
package w˜ that includes a monetary wage w and a term that accounts for the expected cost of
health insurance. In order to simplify and match our model to observable data, we assume that
each ﬁrm oﬀersEHI with given probability pE , determined by random shock iE .
6 In the appendix
we show that the ﬁrm's decision to oﬀer health insurance can be made endogenous. Consistent
with U.S. data compiled by AHRQ and summarized in fact 3 and ﬁgure 2, pE increases with ﬁrm
size. The ﬁrm's expected cost of providing EHI directly is pE [1 + g(n)] qE , where administrative
cost g(n) is a decreasing function of n because it is more costly for a small ﬁrm to oﬀer health
6This is equivalent to modeling the EHI oﬀer decision as a preference shock, see Aizawa and Fang (2013).
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insurance than bigger ﬁrms (see fact 3). We assume that when insurance is not oﬀered, which
happens with probability 1− pE , ﬁrms compensate employees for the average cost of providing
EHI, qE . Thus, total labor compensation is given by
w˜ = w + pE [1 + g(n)] qE + (1− pE)qE
Health insurance market: In the baseline model, there are three types of insurance options
available to ﬁrms and workers: EHI, private insurance, or the opportunity to remain uninsured.
EHI: Households have access to EHI with probability pˆE , which is determined by shock iE . We
diﬀerentiate between pE and pˆE because workers randomly match with ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes,
but each worker has the same probability of receiving an EHI oﬀer. Insurance covers a fraction
φ(m) of total medical expenditures, where φ(·) ∈ [0, 1]. The EHI premium piE does not depend
on the individual's prior health history or any individual states. This accounts for the community
rating practice in the U.S. where group health insurance cannot price-discriminate among the
insured based on such individual characteristics (see fact 5). A fraction ψ ∈ [0, 1] of the premium
is paid by the employer as a subsidy.
Private: If a worker is not oﬀered EHI (or declines the oﬀer), she has the option to purchase
health insurance in a private market at premium piP (m) with coinsurance rate φ(m). This can
also occur if a household becomes a manager and does not oﬀer (or has no access to) EHI.
Once the ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to the worker (iE = 1), the worker chooses either to obtain
coverage (through EHI or private health insurance) or remain uninsured (i′HI = {0, 1}).7 Health
insurance companies are competitive. The premiums for EHI and private plans are determined
by the expected expenditure for each contract plus a proportional markup denoted by η. EHI
has two advantages compared with private insurance:
(i) EHI receives a tax subsidy from the government, which is more cost-eﬃcient for ﬁrms.
(ii) EHI has a more inclusive risk pool, which helps to share risk among the insured.
Government: The government runs a balanced budget each period and provides (only) two
types of ﬁscal policies, which are ﬁnanced through lump sum taxation, τy:
8
• Public safety-net program, TSI : This program guarantees each household a minimum con-
sumption level of c. This reﬂects the option available to U.S. households to rely on public
transfer programs such as food stamps, Medicaid, disability and unemployment insurance
if substantial income and health spending shocks occur.
7In line with Jeske and Kitao (2009), we assume a segmented labor market where employers do not adjust
wages if EHI coverage is declined.
8Jeske and Kitao (2009) show that a distortionary tax with an EHI subsidy constitutes regressive taxation. We
focus on the distortion that EHI induces in occupational choice, hence we abstract from distortionary taxation.
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Figure 3: Talent misallocation
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• In the baseline model, the government subsidizes EHI at rate τs.
3.2 Firm's problem
The ﬁrm's problem is:
max
n,k
Xkαnγ − w˜n− rk (2)
The average cost of hiring labor, w˜, includes monetary wage component w and the expected cost
of EHI or a compensation payment by the ﬁrm when EHI is not oﬀered. See appendix A.2 for
the derivation of n∗ and k∗, for constrained and unconstrained borrowing.
3.3 EHI and talent misallocation
Figure 3 illustrates that misallocation can occur when there is a link between insurance and
employment. Exogenous managerial ability x is on the horizontal axis, which determines the
proﬁt if an individual decides to become an entrepreneur and manage a ﬁrm. Assets minus
idiosyncratic health shocks are on the vertical axis. First consider a frictionless world, where
there is no insurance distortion (or credit constraint).9 In this case there is no link between
9We focus on how health care policy aﬀects occupational choice. Recent U.S. health care reform (ACA) also
imposes an employer mandate that requires ﬁrms with over 50 employees to provide EHI, which could distort a
ﬁrm's labor demand decision. Aizawa and Fang (2013) look at this issue and their results suggest that the eﬀect
is quite small, as does recent data in Garrett and Kaestner (2014).
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employment and insurance, and a cutoﬀ value x∗ exists that diﬀerentiates entrepreneurs from
workers. The vertical dashed line illustrates this. On the right side of the vertical line an agent's
managerial ability x is suﬃciently high to yield greater proﬁt from running a ﬁrm than from
choosing to work at the market wage (i.e., without frictions only the vertical dotted line exists
and the light grey and dark areas are not relevant). Choosing to be a worker is optimal on the
left side of the line.
Now consider occupational choice when health insurance is employment-based and worker
compensation includes a wage and health insurance package. Current U.S. law requires employ-
ers to oﬀer a health plan at a price common to all employees. However, the value of health
insurance to agents varies with their idiosyncratic health risk. Hence, the link between employ-
ment and health insurance creates a gap between the marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt of
health insurance. Figure 3 shows that two types of misallocation can occur: (i) Some healthy
but low ability agents select into entrepreneurship, and (ii) some agents with high ability but
adverse health shocks select out of entrepreneurship. Consider a healthy agent who would choose
to be a worker in the absence of employment-based health insurance. This individual receives a
wage plus health insurance as a worker, and does not value the ﬁrm's health insurance greatly
but cannot get additional compensation if he declines the insurance. This individual may ﬁnd
it more attractive to become an entrepreneur to get a higher return and either self-insure or
get insurance in the private market. This is the light grey area. Now consider an individual
with high managerial ability but an unfavorable health shock. It may be advantageous for this
individual to work for a ﬁrm to get group health insurance. This is the dark area.
Overall the graph shows that some individuals that are healthy but less skilled become
entrepreneurs, while others that are less healthy but highly skilled leave entrepreneurship. These
misallocations relative to a frictionless world are caused by the link between health insurance
and employment. We call this talent misallocation as the individuals in the light grey region
with better health shocks but less managerial skill would be workers absent the EHI friction,
while those with bad health shocks but high ability in the dark region would run ﬁrms. We will
quantify the eﬀects of counterfactual policy experiments on this misallocation.
4 Optimal behavior and equilibrium
In any time period t agents are distinguished by (a, x, z,m, iHI). The timing of the economy is
given as follows.
1. Households enter each new period with assets a and health insurance status iHI from the
previous period.
2. Idiosyncratic shocks x (managerial ability), z (worker productivity) and m (medical ex-
penditure) are drawn by nature.
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Figure 4: Timing
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3. Households make an occupation decision: entrepreneur (Ie = 1) or worker (Ie = 0).
4. Workers randomly match with ﬁrms. Idiosyncratic shock iE is drawn, which determines if
the ﬁrm oﬀers EHI to workers and the manager.
5. Capital and labor markets clear and production takes place.
6. Households choose: health insurance (i′HI = {0, 1}), consumption (c), borrowing/saving
(a′). Managers and workers decide on health insurance purchases.
Figure 4 summarizes the timing. At time t agents make an occupational choice. At time t + 1
workers pay any medical bills (if not insured) or out of pocket (oop) expenses (if insured), receive
the market wage plus insurance (if any), and choose health insurance (EHI, private, or none)
and savings for next period. Entrepreneurs also pay any medical bills (if not insured) or out
of pocket expenses (if insured), manage their business (buy capital and employ workers), and
decide on health insurance (for herself only, for herself and workers, or no insurance) and savings
for the next period.
In the baseline model we assume that workers are randomly matched with ﬁrms in order to
simplify the analysis. Each ﬁrm oﬀers EHI to the worker and herself (the entrepreneur), with
a probability that is correlated with the ﬁrm's size. Contingent on being oﬀered EHI, workers
and the entrepreneur choose whether or not to take up insurance. In appendix A.1 we make the
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ﬁrm's decision to oﬀer health insurance endogenous.10
4.1 Firm manager
Firms are distinguished by their productivity realization x. Agents with suﬃcient ability to
become managers choose the level of capital and the number of employees to maximize proﬁt
subject to a technological constraint and exogenously given health care policy. EHI exists for
historical reasons (see Fact 2 in section 2).11 In order to simplify the exposition, ﬁrst consider
the problem of a manager with talent xi for a given level of capital k (i.e., labor input choice
only):
max
n
Xkαnγ − w˜n (3)
where w˜ = [w + pE (1 + g(n)) qE + (1− pE)qE ] is the ﬁrm's per capita labor cost and g(n) is the
administrative cost of organizing EHI at the ﬁrm level.
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
n∗(k, x, w˜) =
[
γXkα
w˜
]
1
1−γ
(4)
Substituting (4) into (3) yields the manager's proﬁt function for a given level of capital:12
y(k, x, w˜) = Xkα
[
γXkα
w˜
] γ
1−γ
(5)
4.1.1 Remark on random matching
Workers supply labor inelastically at the given wage package w˜. They enter the market and are
randomly matched to ﬁrms. Workers receive EHI with probability pˆE , which is determined by
shock iE . We diﬀerentiate between pE and pˆE because each worker has the same probability
of receiving an EHI oﬀer. Consider two ﬁrms, one big and one small. The bigger ﬁrm oﬀers
insurance with 90% probability and the smaller with 50% probability. From the worker's point
of view, probability pˆE is a weighted average of the two ﬁrms. In general, pˆE =
∫ Ien∗pE(n∗)dΨ(s)∫ Ien∗dΨ(s) .
Equivalently, pˆE =
∫
[
n∗∫
n∗dΨ(s) ]pE(n
∗)dΨ(s), where the weight is given by the term in brackets.
10One reason oﬀering workers insurance may be cheaper than oﬀering a monetary wage is because EHI receives
favorable tax treatment in the U.S. Appendix A.1 shows that using an exogenous shock to decide which individuals
get insurance is equivalent to administrative cost function g(n) receiving an exogenous shock. The key ideas are:
(i) Idiosyncratic administrative health insurance costs are uncertain for ﬁrms, but mean costs decrease as ﬁrm size
increases due to economies of scale. (ii) The idiosyncratic administrative cost determines whether a particular
ﬁrm oﬀers insurance, but larger ﬁrms are much more likely to oﬀer health insurance as they beneﬁt more from
the economies of scale (captured by the decreasing concave function g(n)).
11Clearly it would be more eﬃcient to use an insurance pool. U.S. EHI emerged after WWII in response to
wage and price controls. We take this as given.
12This will adjust with EHI oﬀering status, since EHI has a tax subsidy.
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4.1.2 Capital
Now consider the choice of capital. Let
• a denote the amount of self-ﬁnance; and
• l denote the amount rented from the capital market.
Both sources of funds are used to raise capital, with k = (a − oop) + l, where oop denotes out
of pocket medical expenses. The entrepreneur can either use personal funds net of out-of-pocket
medical spending (a − oop) or rent capital from the market (l). The two sources of funds have
the following costs. The entrepreneur owns capital and therefore the opportunity cost of a is
only the foregone interest the entrepreneur could have received from the capital market. This
amount is given by ra. In addition, the entrepreneur may rent capital in the market, at cost
(1 + ∆)rl, l ≤ l¯. Here l¯ is an upper limit on borrowing. We will ﬁrst consider the case where
this borrowing constraint does not bind.
Self-ﬁnanced ﬁrm: When initial assets are suﬃcient to run a business without renting new
capital from the market (i.e., l = 0), the manager of the ﬁrm solves the problem:
ν(a, x, iE ; w˜, r) = max
k≥0
y(k, x, w˜)− rk − w˜n(k, x, w˜) (6)
This gives the optimal physical capital level:
ν(a, x, iE ; w˜, r) = max
k≥0
Xkα
[
γxkα
w˜
] γ
1−γ
− rk − w˜n (7)
k∗(x, w˜, r) =
[
X
( γ
w˜
)γ (α
r
)1−γ] 11−α−γ
(8)
From equation (5), the manager's proﬁt at the optimal level of capital is:
ν(k∗, x, w) = Xkα
[
γXk∗α
w˜
] γ
1−γ
− w˜n(k∗, x, w˜)− rk∗ (9)
The manager's consumption is determined as follows.
c+ a′ + (1− iHIφ(m))m+ p˜i ≤ (1 + r − δ)a+ ν − τy + TSI + τsiEi′HIpiE (10)
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where
p˜i =

piE i
′
HI = 1, iE = 1
piP (m) i
′
HI = 1, iE = 0
0 i′HI = 0
(11)
TSI = max
{
0, c+ τs − τsiEi′HIpiE + (1− iHIφ(m))m− (1 + r − δ)a− ν(k∗, x, w˜)
}
(12)
a′ ≥ −a¯. (13)
The budget constraint is standard: consumption, saving/borrowing, uncovered (out of pocket)
medical expenses, and insurance premia cannot exceed asset market returns, ﬁrm proﬁt, lump
sum taxes, government transfers, and the insurance subsidy. Lump-sum tax, τy, is collected to
ﬁnance a consumption ﬂoor c and EHI subsidy τs. The premium that the manager pays for
insurance, p˜i, has two components: i′HI is the entrepreneur's choice to buy health insurance for
herself for next period and iE is the shock that indicates that the employer must provide health
insurance to the employee. We focus on three cases: the entrepreneur purchases insurance
for herself and the employees, the entrepreneur purchases insurance only for herself, and the
entrepreneur purchases no insurance. The government defrays the cost of EHI by providing
subsidy τsiEi
′
HIpiE . TSI denotes a transfer from the government as speciﬁed in Hubbard et al.
(1995), where ν are ﬁrm proﬁts, deﬁned by (5), and the ﬁrm's borrowing is determined by the
optimal k∗ as explained in the appendix.
Firm with assets borrowed from the market: When managers do not have enough per-
sonal assets to operate the ﬁrm, they can rent l from the capital market at rate (1 + ∆)r. The
ﬁrm's problem is given as follows.
ν˜∗(k˜, x, w) = max
k˜
Xk˜αn˜γ − w˜n˜− r˜
(
k˜ − (a− oop)
)
(14)
where
r˜ =
r if k˜ ≤ a− oop(1 + ∆)r if k˜ > a− oop (15)
n˜∗(k˜, x, w) =
[
γXk˜α
w˜
] 1
1−γ
. (16)
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4.2 Workers
Workers maximize expected discounted utility of consumption
max
{ct,at+1,iHI,t+1}
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct)
subject to the following budget constraint:
c+ a′ + (1− iHIφ(m))m+ p˜i ≤ (1 + r − δ)a+ w˜z − τy + TSI + τsiEi′HIpiE (17)
where
p˜i =

piE(1− ψ) i′HI = 1, iE = 1
piP (m) i
′
HI = 1, iE = 0
0 i′HI = 0
(18)
w˜ =
w + cE iE = 0w iE = 1 (19)
TSI = max
{
0, c+ τy − τsiEi′HIpiE + (1− iHIφ(m))m− [(1 + r − δ)a+ w˜]
}
(20)
a′ ≥ −a¯ (21)
The worker's budget constraint indicates that consumption, saving/borrowing, out of pocket
medical expenses, and insurance premia cannot exceed asset market returns, total labor com-
pensation, lump sum taxes, government transfers, and the insurance subsidy. The insurance
premium, p˜i, again has two components: i′HI is the agent's choice to buy health insurance for
himself for next period where iE is the shock that indicates that EHI is oﬀered. There are three
cases: the worker gets EHI but must pay the remaining 1 − ψ of the premium not paid for by
the ﬁrm, the worker purchases insurance directly in the private market, or the worker purchases
no insurance. The government defrays the cost of EHI by providing subsidy τsiEi
′
HIpiE . Again
TSI is a transfer from the government that is analogous to the ﬁrm speciﬁcation except that ﬁrm
proﬁts, ν, are replaced by employee total compensation w˜z.
4.3 Government
The government runs a balanced budget with a lump-sum tax τy:
τy =
∫ (
TSI + τsiEi
′
HIpiE
)
dΨ(s)
Ψ(s) represents the distribution of agents in equilibrium, deﬁned in section 4.6.
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4.4 The household's problem
Let Ie indicate occupational choice, where Ie = 1 if the household is an entrepreneur and Ie = 0
if the household is a worker. We can write the household's problem recursively as follows.
V(a, x, z,m, iHI) = max{a′,c,i′HI ,Ie}
[IeVe + (1− Ie)Vw + βEV(a′, x′, z′,m′, i′HI)]
subject to
c+ a′ + oop+ p˜i ≤ (1− r˜ − δ)a+ inc− Tax (22)
where
p˜i =

piE(1− ψ) i′HI = 1, iE = 1
piP (m) i
′
HI = 1, iE = 0
0 i′HI = 0
(23)
Tax = τy − TSI − τsiEi′HIpiE (24)
TSI = max
{
0, c+ τy − τsiEi′HIpiE + oop− [(1− δ)a+ inc]
}
(25)
inc =
ra+ w˜z + (1− iE) qE if Ie = 0ra+ ν(k, x; r˜, w˜) if Ie = 1 (26)
oop = (1− iHIφ(m))m (27)
Tax is the lump sum tax net of social insurance beneﬁt (if applicable) and the health care subsidy,
inc is the earnings of the worker or entrepreneur, and oop is out of pocket medical expense.
The value functions Ve and Vw are deﬁned as follows:
Ve = pE(n
∗)U(c|iE = 1) + (1− pE(n∗))U(c|iE = 0)
Vw = pˆEU(c|iE = 1) + (1− pˆE)U(c|iE = 0).
pˆE and pE reﬂect the random matching between workers and ﬁrms, as explained in section 4.1.2.
4.5 Health insurance
There are two kinds of insurance, private and employer based group insurance. The latter beneﬁts
from pooling and tax advantages, while private insurance has higher administrative costs. The
cost of providing insurance for the ﬁrm is given as:
qE = ψpiE (28)
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The EHI premium equals the average cost of providing insurance:
piE = (1 + η)
∫
iEi
′
HIφ(m)mdΨ(s) (29)
The premium for private insurance equals:
piP (m) = (1 + η)
E [φ(m′)m′|m]
1 + r − δ . (30)
Markup η applies to both EHI and private insurance, consistent with MEPS data.
4.6 Steady state equilibrium
We characterize the steady state equilibrium. Denote the equilibrium aggregate variables by
Φ = {r, w, piE , pˆE , τy}. Individual state variables s = {a, x, z,m, iHI} denote asset holding
a ∈ A, managerial ability x ∈ X, labor productivity z ∈ Z, health spending shock m ∈ M and
insurance status iHI ∈ I. Let S = A× X× Z×M× I denote the entire state space.
Deﬁnition 1 The steady state equilibrium for the economy is given by aggregate variables Φ,
allocations (c, a′, i′HI , Ie) for households characterized by s = (a, x, z,m, iHI) and the distribution
of agents over the state space S given by Ψ(s), s ∈ S, such that:
1. Given Φ, allocations (c, a′, i′HI , Ie) solve the household's optimization problem.
2. The health insurance market is competitive.
3. The asset market clears:
∫
kdΨ(s) =
∫
adΨ(s).
4. The labor market clears:
∫ IendΨ(s) = ∫ (1− Ie) nˆzdΨ(s).
5. The goods market clears.
6. The government balances its budget: τy =
∫
(TSI + τsiEi
′
HIpiE) dΨ(s).
7. Distribution Ψ(s) is time-invariant. The law of motion for the distribution of agents over
the state space S satisﬁes Ψ = FΨ(Ψ), where FΨ is a one-period transition operator on the
distribution, i.e. Ψt+1 = FΨ(Ψt).
Note that labor market equilibrium condition 4 determines the raw wage w.
4.7 Analysis of competitive equilibrium
The following proposition states that there exists a cutoﬀ value that diﬀerentiates entrepreneurs
from workers based on managerial ability, as illustrated in ﬁgure 3.
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Proposition 1 Denote by x∗ the cutoﬀ value such that an agent with x ≥ x∗ becomes an en-
trepreneur; otherwise the agent is a worker. The cutoﬀ value is a function of (a, z,m, iHI).
The proof follows from Antunes, Cavalcanti and Villamil (2008b), where the credit friction
causes x∗ to decrease with an agent's assets. In their case loans are given by l = k − a, at rate
r. The ability to borrow allows some low asset but high ability agents to become entrepreneurs.
In our case l = k − a˜, where a˜ = a − oop and r˜ = (1 + Δ)r, and EHI allows some individuals
with poor health shocks and high ability to become entrepreneurs.
Proposition 2 The cutoﬀ value is decreasing in a, if ∆ > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We show that when EHI is a mandated beneﬁt, this distorts the cutoﬀ value. The follow-
ing proposition states that agents with poor expenditure shocks need a higher x∗ to become
entrepreneurs.
Proposition 3 In the presence of EHI, cutoﬀ value x∗(a, z,m, iHI) increases with the size of
m.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The cutoﬀ value that we compute in the equilibrium is illustrated in ﬁgure 5. The two ﬁgures
indicates that individuals with suﬃciently high ability x, and assets (upper panel) or health
(lower panel), become entrepreneurs. Those below the curve become workers. The cutoﬀ in
managerial ability x∗ depends on other states and the ﬁgure represents an average across labor
productivity states. We illustrate assets a (upper panel) and medical expenditure shocks m
(lower panel) separately.
Consider the upper panel ﬁrst. In the vertical area agents are not credit constrained and
managerial ability x determines occupation: individuals above the line are entrepreneurs and
those below it are workers. The credit friction causes the negatively sloped segment. As Antunes
et al. (2008) show, when agents are credit constrained some high ability but poor entrepreneurs
are unable to fund their ﬁrms and must become workers. In a general equilibrium environment,
this misallocation aﬀects the constrained individuals and other agents through lower output and
(potentially) lower wages for all other workers. This occurs because less talented managers run
smaller and less productive ﬁrms, which depresses wages.
The bottom panel shows a similar pattern for health. Adverse health shocks lower assets
because they raise out of pocket expenses, where net assets are assets, a, minus out of pocket
expenses, oop. Adverse medical expenditure shocks m raise out of pocket expenses, and the
critical x∗ increases with m. As above, in the vertical area managerial ability x determines
occupation in the ﬁgure. In the negatively sloped area those with insurance have percentage
φ(m) of their medical expenditures covered by insurance (EHI or private) and the uninsured must
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Figure 5: Cutoﬀ for ability x
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cover their own expenditure shocks. This reduction in net assets can cause talented individuals
who otherwise would have been entrepreneurs to become workers, an analogous misallocation of
talent.
5 Calibration
Preferences: Household preferences are given by
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct), where U(c) =
c1−ρ−1
1−ρ . The coef-
ﬁcient of relative risk aversion ρ is set to 1.5 in the baseline economy, which follows estimates in
the literature. We also consider ρ = 3 as a robustness check. The subjective time discount factor
β is set to 0.94 so that the aggregate capital-output ratio is 2.33 in the stationary equilibrium,
consistent with U.S. data.
Labor Productivity: We assume that stochastic labor productivity z follows a ﬁrst-order
autoregressive process: ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + εz,t, where εz,t ∼ N(0, σ2z). As in Storesletten et al.
(2004) and Hubbard et al. (1994), we choose the value for coeﬃcient ρz and the residual variance
σ2z to be 0.94 and 0.02 respectively. To facilitate the computation, we approximate this process
by a ﬁve state Markov process using the method of Tauchen and Hussey (1991). The calibrated
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Markov process is represented by ﬁnite states:
z ∈ {0.646, 0.798, 0.966, 1.169, 1.444}
and a transition matrix
Πz =

0.731 0.253 0.016 0.000 0.000
0.192 0.555 0.236 0.017 0.000
0.011 0.222 0.533 0.222 0.011
0.000 0.017 0.236 0.555 0.192
0.000 0.000 0.016 0.253 0.731
 .
Entrepreneurial ability and technology: The entrepreneur is endowed with managerial
ability x and operates a ﬁrm with a neo-classical production function Xkαnγ , where X =
x1−(α+γ). We choose the model capital share α to match the capital share of 0.32 for the
U.S economy for the period 1960-2000. We assume that the stock of capital includes business
equipment and structures, business inventories and business land. For the period 1960-2000,
the capital to output ratio is 2.33 (NIPA, US Department of Commerce (2005), Table 1.3.5).
Cooley and Prescott (1995) indicate that the share of capital averaged about 0.32 for the period
19602000. We choose labor share γ to match the fraction of entrepreneurs of 7.6% in the U.S.
economy. Depending on the deﬁnition of entrepreneur used, Cagetti and De Nardi (2006, table
1) report that US entrepreneurs ranged from 7.6 to 16.7 percent of the population using data
from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We choose 7.6% because the SCF surveys
households rather than small businesses and includes professional practices (law, medicine, etc.),
farms, ﬁnancial, and real estate businesses that are not relevant for our occupational choice
model. See Herranz, Krasa and Villamil (2009, p. 347) for a discussion of alternative data sets.
Guner, Ventura and Xu (2008) calibrate ability distribution f(x) to be consistent with 1997
US Economic Census data on the fraction of establishments at diﬀerent employment levels. They
use data on all sectors to calculate the following targets: mean establishment size, fraction of
establishments over the number of employees, and the share of total employment accounted for
by large establishments (> 100 employees). They select the ability distribution to match these
statistics. We use the same procedure and assumptions to calibrate f(x).13 The distribution is
log-normal with mean µx and variance σ
2
x, so that log(x) ∼ N(µx, σ2x), with most mass at the
bottom and an extreme value for managerial ability that captures the remainder at the very top.
We ﬁnd µx and σ
2
x to match the fraction of ﬁrms at diﬀerent levels of employees and the mean
size of establishments, which are listed in Table 2. In line with Guner, Ventura and Xu (2008),
13They assume that log-managerial ability is distributed according to a truncated normal distribution f(x),
with mean µ and variance σ2. This distribution accounts for most ﬁrms, with total mass 1 − fmax. To account
for the remainder of the distribution of establishments, they select a top value for managerial ability, xmax > x,
with corresponding fraction fmax.
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we truncate the distribution of x and approximate it with 40 grid points.
Health spending shocks and health insurance: We use Medical Expenditure Panel Sur-
vey (MEPS) data to estimate health expenditure shocks and health insurance. We focus on the
working population and use seven states for health expenditures. In line with Jeske and Kitao
(2009), we divide data into bins of size (20%, 20%, 20%, 20%, 15%, 4%, 1%). The ﬁrst bin contains
all agents whose health expenditures fall in the bottom twenty percentiles, while the last bin has
agents inside the ﬁrst percentile of the distribution. We represent each bin using the mean expen-
diture in that bin and normalize them in terms of the average earnings in 2003 (based on MEPS
2003, the average wage income of all heads of households is $32, 800). To this end, health spend-
ing follows a ﬁnite state Markov chain, with m ∈ {0.000, 0.006, 0.022, 0.061, 0.171, 0.500, 1.594}.
The transition matrix for m is estimated by counting the fraction of agents who move into each
bin in the following year.
Πm =

0.542 0.243 0.113 0.061 0.032 0.007 0.002
0.243 0.330 0.242 0.117 0.056 0.011 0.001
0.119 0.224 0.296 0.232 0.098 0.025 0.006
0.058 0.130 0.225 0.347 0.201 0.035 0.005
0.043 0.079 0.140 0.263 0.371 0.090 0.014
0.030 0.063 0.080 0.203 0.359 0.200 0.065
0.008 0.024 0.073 0.106 0.269 0.286 0.233

.
We calibrate the coinsurance rate for each of the seven shocks from the MEPS data, which
is given as follows.
Health spending m > 0.000 0.006 0.022 0.061 0.171 0.500 1.594
φ(m) 0.341 0.532 0.594 0.645 0.702 0.765 0.845
The probability of providing EHI is increasing with ﬁrm size and administrative costs decrease
with ﬁrm size. The probability pE(n) that a ﬁrm in a given size bin, measured by number of
employees, oﬀers health insurance is taken from the AHRQ, averaged over 2003-2014. See fact 3
in section 2. We construct g(n) from SBA (2011, p. 38) data. The SBA found that administrative
costs for insurers of small ﬁrm health insurance plans make up about 25 to 27 percent of premiums
compared to about 5 to 11 percent for large companies with self-insured health plans. We use
these estimates to construct concave administrative cost function g(n). See appendix A.1.
Firm size (bin j) n < 10 10− 24 25− 99 100− 999 n > 1000
pE(n) 0.336 0.625 0.816 0.943 0.992
Administrative cost, g(n) 0.3 0.21 0.132 0.0849 0.06
On average 62% of U.S. private ﬁrms oﬀered health insurance to employees in 2009. See
AHRQ, Center for Financing, Access and Cost Trends, 2009 MEPS_IC, Table I.A.2.
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Government: The minimum consumption ﬂoor c is calibrated so that the model has 20% of
households with net worth of less than $5, 000 in the benchmark economy. The payroll tax is 12%,
consistent with U.S. Social Security and diability taxes, see https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/oasdiRates.html.
Lump-sum tax τy is chosen in equilibrium to balance the overall government budget.
We must choose seven parameters to reproduce observations. The parameters are γ, α, µ,
σ, xmax, fmax and β. The model matches the fraction of establishments at diﬀerent levels of
employees, the share of employment in establishments with more than 100 employees, mean ﬁrm
size, the aggregate capital share and aggregate capital to output ratio. Table 1 summarizes our
choices. The model period is one year.
Table 1: Parameter values, baseline economy
Parameters Values Description Comments/observations
β 0.94 Discount factor target K/Y ratio 2.33
α 0.3207 Capital share target K share of 0.32
ρ 1.5, 3 Risk aversion
γ 0.4693 Frac. of entrepreneurs target 7.6%, Cagetti et al. (2006)
µx −0.3667 Mean of distribution of x Guner et al. (2008)
σx 2.302 Std. dev of distribution of x Guner et al. (2008)
m see text Health spending shock MEPS
φ(m) see text Coinsurance rate MEPS
η 0.1 Markup of health insurance MEPS
ψ 0.8 Employer contribution to EHI MEPS
g(n) see text Cost of providing EHI SBA (2011)
pE(n) see text Probability of providing EHI AHRQ
pˆE 0.558 % covered by EHI MEPS
c $9700 Consumption ﬂoor 20% hhs with wealth < $5000
τs 12% Payroll tax Social Security Adm
δ 6% Capital depreciation NIPA
6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst present the performance of our benchmark model. We then explain the
design of policy experiments, followed by a detailed analysis of two counter-factual experiments.
Finally, we provide some remarks on our numerical exercises.
6.1 Baseline Economy
Our model succeeds in matching several aspects of the macroeconomy, including the distribution
of ﬁrm size measured by the number of employees and observed patterns of health insurance
coverage. Table 2 summarizes the performance of our model. In the benchmark, entrepreneurs
account for 5.33% of the population, which is below the target of 7.6%. This underestimate of
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Table 2: Benchmark
Statistics U.S. Data Baseline Economy
Annual real interest rate 4.0 4.33
Aggregate capital share 0.33 0.36
Capital output ratio 2.5 2.42
% of entrepreneurs 7.0 5.33
Mean size of the ﬁrm 17.09 17.76
% ﬁrm at 0-9 70.7 74.98 (x¯1 = 1.55)
% ﬁrm at 10-19 14.0 10.24 (x¯2 = 2.05)
% ﬁrm at 20-49 9.4 9.38 (x¯3 = 2.38)
% ﬁrm at 50-99 3.2 2.53 (x¯4 = 2.82)
% ﬁrm at 100+ 2.6 2.87 (x¯5 = 3.63)
% of employment at ﬁrm 100+ 44.95 44.01
Health insurance take-up ratio
all 75.7 73.75
EHI oﬀered 99.0 97.9
EHI not oﬀered 35.5 32.8
Note: The number in parenthesis is average ability level xi in each ﬁrm size group i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
entrepreneurs is attributed to the fact that our model of occupational choice does not account
for other reasons that individuals choose to become entrepreneurs such as the utility value from
being your own boss.14 Hence our analysis provides a lower bound. On average, ﬁrms hire
17.76 employees in our benchmark, very close to 17.09 in the data, see, Gunar, Ventura and Xu
(2008, table 2). The model is also successful in reproducing the fraction of ﬁrms with the selected
levels of employment. Table 4 shows that average ability in each ﬁrm group increases with size,
and ﬁrms in the largest size group are more than twice as productive (x¯5 = 3.63) as those in the
smallest group (x¯1 = 1.55). In terms of health insurance coverage, our model has a take-up ratio
of 73.75%, compared with 75.7% in the MEPS data.15 The take-up ratio is the share of agents
who choose to purchase health insurance coverage given an oﬀer (agents may choose to remain
uninsured).
6.2 Policy designs
In this section we report the results of two policy experiments designed to estimate the amount of
misallocation associated with employment based health insurance: (i) replace EHI with optional
private indemnity insurance, and (ii) expand EHI from the current 62% of ﬁrms in the U.S. to
100%. Tables 4 and 5 report key statistics across the policy experiments.
14De Nardi, Doctor and Krane (2007), table 1, ﬁnd that entrepreneur's earnings are 3 to 4 times the earning of
others in the Survey of Consumer Finances. In our baseline economy the ratio is about 6 (see table 3 below). Our
model under predicts the fraction of entrepreneurs, which leads to a higher earnings ratio relative to SCF data.
15Employment-based insurance involves three factors: a worker must be employed by a ﬁrm that oﬀers coverage,
the worker must be eligible for coverage, and the worker must choose to take-up coverage.
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6.2.1 No EHI: Private indemnity contract
This experiment considers the case where there is no EHI and all insurance is purchased on
the private market (if any). The premium is actuarially fair and there are no tax insurance
subsidies. The insurance provider pays for health expenditures incurred by an individual. The
policy resembles a contingent claim and is eﬃcient by design. This policy gives an estimate of
the potential cost of misallocation associated with EHI relative to the baseline. The insurance
take up rate falls from the baseline level of 75.26% to 23.2% in table 3.16 This is not surprising
since private insurance is disadvantaged relative to EHI. Table 4 shows that the percentage of
entrepreneurs falls from the baseline level of 5.46% to 4.93% because exposure to medical risk
has increased and the potential assets available to invest in the ﬁrm have decreased (most agents
choose to self insure). Average ﬁrm size increases from the baseline by 1.4% and output per
ﬁrm increases by over 10%. Overall, we see fewer entrepreneurs running larger ﬁrms that are
more productive. Worker and ﬁrm earnings increase. This leads to an aggregate welfare gain of
2.28 relative to the baseline. Almost all agents have a positive consumption-equivalent variation
(CEV). The use of social insurance c¯ and taxes are higher than in the baseline.
6.2.2 Expansion of EHI
This experiment considers the polar opposite case that requires all ﬁrms to oﬀer EHI, expanding
the program from the current 62% level in the U.S. to cover 100% of workers, maintaining other
baseline parameters. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 show that there is a tradeoﬀ: When EHI
is expanded to 100% more people are insured (the insurance take-up increases from 75.26% to
99.98%), and health insurance makes agents better able to bear the risk of entrepreneurship.
Oﬀering EHI to all workers raises the cost of workers for ﬁrms, where (28) gives the average cost
of providing insurance. This eﬀect would tend to depress average ﬁrm size, which drops from
the baseline by 4% in table 4. On the other hand, all individuals now have insurance at low
cost (taxes drop from 1.78% in table 3 to 1.22%), hence individuals have more funds to invest in
a ﬁrm. We should expect to see more entrepreneurs, and table 4 shows that the percentage of
entrepreneurs increases from 5.46% in the baseline to 5.67%. Overall, we see more entrepreneurs
running smaller ﬁrms that are less productive. The average ability for each size group, x¯, is
reported in parenthesis in table 4 and falls from x5 = 3.63 for the largest ﬁrm group to x1 = 1.51
for the smallest group. Table 4 shows that EHI expansion leads to a fall in the percentage of
ﬁrms in the three highest groups (i.e., more small ﬁrms) and a decline in productivity of the
smallest ﬁrm groups (x¯1 and x¯2 fall to 1.51 and 1.98 from the baseline values 1.55 and 2.05).
Productivity falls because some individuals with lower managerial talent become entrepreneurs.
This occurs because they no longer need to either self-insure to cover medical shocks or buy more
16We abstract from externalities such as communicable diseases and vaccinations, which would raise the socially
optimal indemnity insurance rate. See Sun and Yannelis (2016) on measuring the insurance premium externality
of individuals who choose not to purchase insurance in a diﬀerent context.
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expensive private health insurance, and they can use the funds to open ﬁrms. This misallocation
of talent leads to an aggregate welfare loss of −0.61% relative to the baseline, with only 3.8%
having a positive CEV.
Table 3: Aggregate variables, ρ = 1.5
Statistics Base EHI exp Indemnity
Insurance take-up 75.26 99.98 23.2
real r (%) 4.34 4.34 4.30
wage 100 100.1 96.1
Worker earnings 100 97.51 110.2
Entrepreneur earnings 100 96.14 110.4
Aggregate output 100 99.97 100.17
% at c¯ 2.71 0.97 8.42
Ag. Welfare (%CEV) - - 0.61 2.28
% with CEV>0 - 3.8 96.05
tax/earn % 1.78 1.22 3.38
6.3 Size distribution
Table 4 shows how the two alternative policies aﬀect the size distribution of ﬁrms. EHI expan-
sion and the private insurance indemnity (no EHI) reduce the percentage of smallest ﬁrms (0-9
employees) but expand the next group (10-19 employees). This group's productivity falls from
x¯2 = 2.05 to 1.98. For the remaining groups, EHI expansion reduces the percentage of ﬁrms with
20-49, 50-99 and 100+ employees respectively, while the indemnity increases these larger and
more productive groups. Overall, there are fewer entrepreneurs under the indemnity (4.93%)
than under EHI expansion (5.67%). Furthermore, these entrepreneurs run larger (average ﬁrm
size of 111.4% versus 95.98%, compared with the baseline) and more productive ﬁrms (average
productivity of 102.45% versus 99.09%) under the indemnity policy experiment versus the EHI
expansion policy.
One of the points of our analysis is that in a model with heterogeneity, averages and coarse
ﬁrm bin sizes can mask important individual changes. Presumably the goal of the policy is
not to increase the number of entrepreneurs, but rather to maximize consumption. This goal
is accomplished by allocating individuals and capital to their most productive use. We now
consider welfare analyses at the individual level to evaluate the consumption gains and losses
from the policy changes.
6.4 Individual CEV: conditional change
We measure the consumption-equivalent variation (CEV) of a speciﬁc health policy by how
much lifetime consumption, in percentage terms, an agent in state (a, x, z,m, iHI) would gain
or lose under the new policy in the steady-state, compared to the initial steady-state. Put
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Table 4: Policy experiments
Statistics Base EHI exp Indemnity
K/Y 2.42 2.42 2.43
Aggregate output 100 99.97 100.17
Entrepreneur % 5.46 5.67 4.93
Ave x (all ﬁrms) 100 99.09 102.46
Output per ﬁrm 100 96.19 110.97
Output per worker 100 100.16 99.58
Ave ﬁrm size 100 95.98 111.4
% ﬁrm at 0-9 74.98 (x¯1 = 1.55) 68.86 (x¯1 = 1.52) 64.83 (x¯1 = 1.54)
% ﬁrm at 10-19 10.24 (x¯2 = 2.05) 17.02 (x¯2 = 1.98) 19.21 (x¯2 = 1.98)
% ﬁrm at 20-49 9.38 (x¯3 = 2.38) 8.96 (x¯3 = 2.38) 10.13 (x¯3 = 2.38)
% ﬁrm at 50-99 2.53 (x¯4 = 2.82) 2.42 (x¯4 = 2.82) 2.74 (x¯4 = 2.82)
% ﬁrm at 100+ 2.87 (x¯5 = 3.63) 2.74 (x¯5 = 3.63) 3.10 (x¯5 = 3.63)
Note: The number in parenthesis is average ability level xi in each ﬁrm size group i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
diﬀerently, we ask how much an agent with wealth-productivity tuple (a, x, z,m, iHI) in the
initial steady-state would be willing to pay as a percentage of lifetime consumption to avoid
the reform. This is a conditional change because it is computed for an individual in a particular
state. The consumption-equivalent variation (CEV) is the amount, $(a, x, z,m, iHI), that solves
the equation:
E0Σ∞t=0βtu ([1 +$(a, x, z,m, iHI)] c∗t ) = E0Σ∞t=0βtu (cˆt)
c∗t denotes consumption in the initial state, while cˆt is consumption under the new policy. For the
case of CRRA preferences, u(c) = c
1−ρ−1
1−ρ , we can exploit the homogeneity of the utility function
and the solution to the above equation is given by
$(a, x,m, iHI) =
[
Vˆ (a, x, z,m, iHI) +
1
(1−ρ)(1−β)
V ∗(a, x, z,m, iHI) + 1(1−ρ)(1−β)
] 1
1−ρ
− 1.
The CEV is computed for an individual that is in a particular state, thus we consider welfare
plots for various states $(a, x, z,m, iHI).
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Figure 6: CEV, no EHI (private indemnity insurance only)
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Figure 6 shows the CEV for the experiment where the current EHI baseline is replaced by
private indemnity insurance. We illustrate two health expenditure shocks, high and low, and we
introduce private indemnity insurance (only) relative to the individual's three insurance states:
uninsured, baseline EHI insurance, and baseline private insurance. This policy gives an aggregate
welfare gain of 2.28 in table 3, and 96.05% of people have positive welfare gains. This policy
produces relatively high welfare gains for high ability and high asset individuals. The safety net
helps the very poor with bad shocks, but overall the policy tends to slightly reduce welfare for a
few low ability and some low asset individuals.
Figure 7: Conditional welfare change, EHI expansion
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Figure 7 shows the conditional welfare change for EHI expansion to 100% coverage. We again
consider two health shocks, high and low, when we expand EHI relative to the three insurance
states for the individual: uninsured, baseline EHI insurance, and private insurance. The ﬁgure
shows that expanding EHI increases the conditional welfare of high ability individuals (especially
with high assets), and leads to welfare losses for low ability and poor agents. When the medical
expenditure shock is high and individuals have baseline EHI or private insurance, we see that
there are some welfare gains for the very poor, but overall EHI expansion largely favors high
ability, high asset individuals because the lump sum taxes are inconsequential for these agents.
Table 3 shows that the lump sum taxes required to fund the EHI expansion program are lower
(1.22%) than in the baseline case (1.78%), thus expanded EHI reduces the tax on earnings. The
policy beneﬁts individuals with high ability and low assets because they now have insurance and
more resources to invest in their ﬁrm. Table 3 also shows that the earnings of entrepreneurs are
much higher than the earnings of workers, and expanded EHI reduces the risk of health shocks.
As a consequence, members of this high ability, low asset group may now switch their occupation
from worker to entrepreneur. Finally, table 3 shows that when individual gains and losses are
summed over all agents there is a net welfare loss of -0.61, with only 3.8% of individuals having
a positive welfare gain (CEV>0). The ﬁgure shows the distribution of gains and losses is ﬂat
except for losses for the very poor and gains for the very rich and able.
6.5 CEV and risk aversion: stationary distribution
In this experiment we increase ρ from the baseline value of 1.5 to 3. Table 5 shows that under the
indemnity, as expected, insurance uptake increases from 23.2% to 46.5% and welfare increases
from 2.28% to 2.8% CEV. In the baseline, a few individuals have large gains and some have small
losses. This occurs because few agents choose to buy private insurance, but the few poor agents
with insurance beneﬁt greatly. Overall, the losses are largest for the insured poor and low ability
agents. In the baseline where agents are relatively tolerant to risk, some (8.42%) are willing to
accept the protection provided by the social insurance program that gives consumption ﬂoor c
and is paid for through the tax system. Many individuals choose to remain uninsured because
private insurance is relatively expensive. When agents are more risk averse (ρ = 3), the poor
value insurance more because it is diﬃcult for them to self-insure. Under the indemnity, output
and eﬃciency increase, and the percentage of entrepreneurs decreases, but not by as much as
whenρ = 1.5. When EHI is expanded to 100%, and agents are more risk averse, the welfare loss
is smaller (- 0.41 versus - 0.61.) More agents have CEV > 0, but the percentage remains low.
6.6 Policy Summary
We consider two alternative health insurance policies relative to an EHI baseline: (i) replace EHI
with a private insurance indemnity (only), and (ii) extend EHI to 100% coverage. Our baseline
model incorporates distortions in the U.S. economy that we take as given. First, U.S. law (The
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Table 5: Aggregate variables, ρ = 3
Statistics Base EHI exp Indemnity
K/Y 3.31 3.03 3.06
real r (%) 2.64 2.65 2.59
Aggregate output 100 99.9 100.39
Insurance take-up 76.0 99.98 46.5
Entrepreneur % 5.50 5.70 4.98
Ave x 100 99.18 102.42
Ave ﬁrm size 100 96.39 111.13
% at c¯ 2.64 0.94 0.72
Ag. Welfare - - 0.41 2.80
% with CEV>0 - 16.54 95.58
tax/earn % 1.76 1.22 2.92
% ﬁrm at 0-9 76.0 (x¯1 = 1.53) 70.34 (x¯1 = 1.45) 66.67 (x¯1 = 1.46)
% ﬁrm at 10-19 9.8(x¯2 = 2.05) 16.11 (x¯2 = 1.98) 18.11 (x¯2 = 1.98)
% ﬁrm at 20-49 9.0 (x¯3 = 2.38) 8.51 (x¯3 = 2.38) 9.61 (x¯3 = 2.38)
% ﬁrm at 50-99 2.4 (x¯4 = 2.82) 2.28 (x¯4 = 2.82) 2.55 (x¯4 = 2.82)
% ﬁrm at 100+ 2.7 (x¯5 = 3.63) 2.60 (x¯5 = 3.63) 2.93 (x¯5 = 3.61)
Note: The number in parenthesis is average ability level xi in each ﬁrm size group i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), amended by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)) mandates beneﬁts, requiring insurance
premia based on a community rating rather than individual risk characteristics, and it sets mini-
mum coverage standards. Second, there is a credit market friction, which we model as a standard
interest rate wedge that is common across the policies. Third, the EHI baseline is advantaged
relative to the other policies because in the U.S. EHI enjoys favorable tax treatment, has a more
inclusive risk pool, and has economies of scale in administrative costs. Given the environment,
our results indicate that the insurance indemnity gives the highest welfare gains (2.28% versus -
0.61% for expanded EHI in table 3) when risk aversion is 1.5, and the corresponding net welfare
numbers when ρ = 3 are 2.80% for the indemnity and - 0.41 for expanded EHI in table 5. Due
to agent heterogeneity, the policies have very diﬀerent eﬀects at the individual level.
Consider ﬁrst the insurance indemnity. This policy replaces EHI with a contract under which
the insurance provider pays for the individual's health expenditures. This contract is eﬃcient by
design, thus it is not surprising that it delivers positive net welfare gains. The take up ratio is
23.2% in table 3 and 46.5% in table 5 for this ex ante insurance contract, and ex post insurance
occurs in the form of a higher c¯ of 8.42% when ρ = 1.5 (table 3) and 0.72% when ρ = 3 (table 5)
that is paid for through the tax system when agents are hit with bad medical shocks. Notably,
capital increases under the private insurance indemnity when agents are more risk averse (ρ = 3),
which allows individuals to both better self insure and expand ﬁrm size. The increase in ﬁrm
size is evident in table 4 under the indemnity, where the percentage of ﬁrms in the smallest size
bin declines from 74.98% to 64.83%, and all other ﬁrm size bins increase.
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Under expanded EHI health insurance becomes universal, taxes fall from 1.78% to 1.22%,
and c¯ falls from 2.71 to 0.97%. Nonetheless welfare declines by −0.61% because worker and
entrepreneur earnings decline due to changes in the distribution of ﬁrm sizes and lower output
and eﬃciency.
Appendix A. 4 shows that these results are robust to changes in the administrative cost
structure for health insurance and when we shut down the capital market distortion.
7 Conclusion
This paper identiﬁes a new friction and shows how alternative health care policies aﬀect the
macroeconomy and welfare. When insurance is linked to employment and individuals are het-
erogeneous, talent misallocation can occur: Some individuals with high managerial talent but
poor health shocks become workers, while other individuals with moderate managerial talent
but good health become entrepreneurs. Because entrepreneurs create jobs, the misallocation of a
few key individuals aﬀects the broader macroeconomy, including ﬁrm size, output and earnings.
Understanding the nature of this misallocation is important because poorly designed health care
policies can exacerbate distortions instead of correcting them. The Council of Economic Advisers
(2009) noted that one policy goal of health insurance reform is to reduce the tax on small ﬁrms
associated with EHI to encourage entrepreneurship. Our occupational choice model shows that
policy induced talent misallocation alters the endogenously determined distribution of ﬁrm sizes
and EHI can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on welfare, depending on how it is structured.
The contribution of our paper is to show that the link between health insurance and employ-
ment creates a friction that can lead to talent misallocation. We brieﬂy consider three extensions.
We focus on lump sum taxes because they do not distort occupational choice. Such taxes are
more burdensome to poor agents than to rich. Progressive taxes could attenuate some of the
welfare gains of high asset individuals and raise the welfare of lower asset agents by changing
the tax burden. In general we ﬁnd that higher ability agents enjoy the largest individual welfare
gains and this better treatment of high ability agents is a standard result in optimal taxation
for eﬃciency reasons - expanding the tax base by encouraging more productive individuals to
work more permits marginal rates on less productive individuals to be lowered. In our model
the analog is that it is more eﬃcient for higher ability individuals to run larger ﬁrms, ceteris
paribus, and they must be compensated to do this. See Scheuer (2014) for an analysis of optimal
taxation and entrepreneurship.
In our model both managerial talent and health are given exogenously. Cole, Kim and Krueger
(2014) construct a model that abstracts from occupational choice but where individuals can exert
eﬀort to maintain their current and future health. In their model this induces a stochastic link
between eﬀort and future health status with an associated moral hazard problem. Considering
talent misallocation where actions today aﬀect future health and productivity would extend our
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focus on health insurance to provide insights about the evolution of health.
A ﬁnal extension involves the labor market. As in Jeske and Kitao (2009), we assume a
segmented labor market where employers do not adjust wages if EHI coverage is declined. Instead
we could consider perfect compensation substitutability where workers sort to employers based
on the demand for health insurance. This labor market structure might reduce occupational
misallocation since a healthy agent can sort to a ﬁrm that oﬀers monetary compensation but
no EHI. Misallocation will continue to exist as long as private health insurance is not a perfect
substitute for EHI. Nevertheless it would be interesting to see how a diﬀerent market structure
aﬀects occupational misallocation. A model that considers search and matching in the labor
market could address this issue. For example, Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides (2001)
provide a good benchmark, but they do not consider the impact of health policy on ﬁrm and
employment decisions. Incorporating a search friction into our model would also allow us to
analyze the interaction between entrepreneurship and unemployment. These issues go beyond
the current paper and we leave them for future research.
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Appendix
A.1 Endogenous ﬁrm insurance oﬀer decision
We simpliﬁed whether or not a ﬁrm oﬀers insurance by treating it as as a preference shock,
where iE = 1 indicates the ﬁrm oﬀers insurance and iE = 0 indicates it does not. This section
makes the ﬁrm's choice to oﬀer insurance endogenous because it is the least costly compensation
alternative, given a cost structure. Figure 2 and the data in Section 5 on ﬁrm size indicate that
large ﬁrms oﬀer insurance with higher probability than small ﬁrms. We display the data again
for convenience:
Firm size (j bins) n < 10 10− 24 25− 99 100− 999 n > 1000
pE(n) 0.336 0.625 0.816 0.943 0.992
Administrative cost, g(n) 0.3 0.21 0.132 0.0849 0.06
In the model, we assume that total labor compensation is given by
w˜ = w + pE
[
1 + g(n)qjA
]
qE + (1− pE)qE
In the data we do not observe idiosyncratic administrative cost shock qjA, and therefore we cannot
establish whether an individual ﬁrm chooses to oﬀer insurance, which corresponds to the decision
iE = 1. However, we know that the ﬁrm will choose the least costly of its two options, and this
will provide the link between unobserved ﬁrm choice iE and observed probability pE(n).
The ﬁrm's expected cost of providing EHI directly is [1 + g(n)qjA]qE , where qE is the fair
price of insurance and qjAis the expected administrative cost of insuring workers in ﬁrm size bin
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j. Under actuarily fair insurance, the cost of insurance equals the expected health shock, which
is the price that would be charged in a perfectly competitive market
qE =
s∑
s=0
E [pisφsms] , (31)
pis is the probability of the shock given state of the world s, φs is the co-insurance rate, and ms
is the health shock. We introduce an expected administration cost qA that aﬀects the economies
of scale that ﬁrms face g(n),
qE(n) = g(n)q
j
A +
s∑
s=0
E [pisφsms] , (32)
where shock qA is uniformly distributed.
17 Although the idiosyncratic administrative cost is
uncertain for ﬁrms, the mean cost is decreasing as ﬁrm size increases. This is due to the presence
of g(n), a decreasing function of n, which we assume is n
θ
n , in order to capture the eﬀect evident
in ﬁgure 2: it is more costly, on average, for a small ﬁrm to oﬀer health insurance than bigger
ﬁrms due to economies of scale.
In a competitive market without commitment, if a ﬁrm does not oﬀer health insurance it
must raise wages by an amount b. We deﬁne b as the monetary compensation that would
make the worker indiﬀerent between having insurance or being given a higher wage such that
EU [w+ [1 + g(n)qA] qE ] = EU [w+ b].
18 As workers are risk averse it follows that compensation
payment b will be higher than the fair price of insurance qE .
Due to the presence of the idiosyncratic administration cost qjA, oﬀering insurance may not
always be cheaper for an individual ﬁrm than oﬀering a higher wage. It follows that a ﬁrm will
oﬀer health insurance if the cost of doing so is less than the compensation payment,
w +
[
1 + g(n)qjA
]
qE < w + b (33)
The idiosyncratic administration cost is important in determining whether a particular ﬁrm oﬀers
insurance, nonetheless larger ﬁrms are much more likely to oﬀer health insurance as they beneﬁt
from economies of scale captured through the decreasing concave function g(n).
In the model we express the total wage package for workers as
w˜ = w + iE
[
1 + g(n)qjA
]
qE + (1− iE)b (34)
17Idiosyncratic uncertainty stems from the fact ﬁrms do not know the health status of individuals they employ,
heterogeneity in U.S. state laws, and bargaining power.
18This expression is an incentive compatibility constraint for workers, and is consistent with evidence from
Olson (2002) and (Dey and Flinn 2005) that workers who are not oﬀered beneﬁts are given higher wages.
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where iE = {0, 1}. Firms choose iE = 1 when the cost of providing EHI is lower than the
compensation payment, and iE = 0 otherwise. Probability pE that the ﬁrm oﬀers insurance is
the value such that the expected value of the two payments is w˜, when b = qE .
19
If we assume that the average idiosyncratic shock qjA has the same mean and distribution
across all ﬁrm sizes, we can infer an estimate of the value of g(n) and hence the role that
economies of scale have on the decision to oﬀer health insurance. It follows that there will be
a critical value of the idiosyncratic shock qˆA that determines whether a ﬁrm oﬀers insurance or
not. We obtain this critical value by rearranging equation (34)
qˆA =
1
g(n)
[
b
qE
− 1
]
(35)
If the realized idiosyncratic shock is lower (higher) than the critical value qjA < qˆA (q
j
A > qˆA),
then a ﬁrm will oﬀer (not oﬀer) insurance. Substituting values of g(n) into the above equation
we see that as ﬁrm size increases, the critical level increases. This means that larger ﬁrms are
more likely to oﬀer health insurance as it will take a signiﬁcantly higher idiosyncratic health cost,
compared to smaller ﬁrms, to exceed the critical value.
Remark on administrative cost markup g(n) Note that n∗ will depend on the size of the
ﬁrm, which depends on the functional form of the markup on health insurance g(n). Under
actuarily fair insurance, the cost of insurance is equal to the expected health shock. This is the
cost of insurance that would be oﬀered in a perfectly competitive market.
qE =
s∑
s=0
E [pisφsms] . (36)
We denote by qE the cost of insurance, pi is the probability of the shock given state of the world s,
ϕ is the insurance rate, and mS is the value of the health shock. We introduce an administrative
cost for small ﬁrms, qA.
qE(n) = λ
jqA +
s∑
s=0
E [pisφsms] . (37)
To approximate g(n), we assume that λ is a decreasing function of ﬁrm size n, where j is the
number of intervals that λ deceases over. The administration costs represents the notion that
the cost of group health insurance is decreasing in ﬁrm size because the ﬁxed cost component is
spread over a larger base.
Consider the simple case where j equals two. Economies-of-scale occur for suﬃciently large
ﬁrms and not for small ﬁrms. Hence, for small ﬁrms, λ is equal to 1.
19The optimal value of b diﬀers across individuals due to heterogeneity in individuals' previous health costs.
The ﬁrm can calculate b based on the average expected health costs. The model assumes complete information.
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The optimal n∗ for small ﬁrms therefore can be expressed as
max
n
xikαnγ − [iE (w + (1 + λ(n)qA − ψ) qE) + (1− iE) (w + bE)]n (38)
The FOC is given as
n′(k, x, w) = γxikαnγ−1 − [iE (w + (1 + λ′(n)qA − ψ) qE)+ (1− iE) (w + bE)] = 0 (39)
Diﬀerent n∗ will exist depending on the size of the ﬁrm. Crucially, this will depend on how λ is
distributed. We will assume that λ decreases over a number of intervals j. Consider the simple
case where j equals two; there are economies-of-scale for suﬃciently large ﬁrms and not for small
ﬁrms. Hence, for small ﬁrms, λ is equal to 1. The optimal n∗ for small ﬁrms therefore is
nj
∗
SMALL(k, x, w) =
[
γxikα
iE (w + (1 + qA − ψ) qE) + (1− iE) (w + bE)
]
1
1−γ
For a large ﬁrm which can beneﬁt from economies of scale n∗ is
nj
∗
LARGE(k, x, w) =
[
γxikα
iE (w + (1 + λqA − ψ) qE) + (1− iE) (w + bE)
]
1
1−γ
where λ ∈ (0, 1). Naturally, in this simple case there is an incentive for ﬁrms suﬃciently close to
the point where it becomes a large ﬁrm to employ more workers in order to obtain the savings
from economies-of-scale.20 From now on, we will use the subscript j to indicate that there are
multiple steady-state variables depending on the distribution of the savings due to economies of
scale λ.
Substituting n∗ into (38) yields the manager's proﬁt function for a given level of capital:21
yji (k, x, w) = xk
α
[
γxikα
iE (w + (1 + λjqA − ψ) qE) + (1− iE) (w + bE)
] γ
1−γ
(40)
As λ decreases with ﬁrm size, administration costs (qA) will be lower for larger ﬁrms. Hence,
larger ﬁrms will beneﬁt from economies of scale and subsequently induce them to employ more
workers (n) and produce more output (y).
A. 2 Derivation of k∗
Now consider the choice of capital. Let a denote the amount of self-ﬁnanced capital and l denote
the amount of funds borrowed from a bank. Both sources of funds are used to raise capital, with
20This does not occur when the economies-of-scale eﬀect λ is a convex function such as n
θ
n
. It can be shown
that the marginal savings for a ﬁrm employing one more worker would not be greater than the marginal cost of
employing one more worker.
21This will adjust with EHI oﬀering status, since EHI beneﬁts from a tax subsidy.
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k(·) = a(·) + l(·). There is no commitment problem regarding bank loan repayment, so the two
sources of funds have the same cost.
Unconstrained ﬁrm When initial assets are suﬃcient to run a business without resorting to
credit ﬁnance (i.e., l = 0), the manager of the ﬁrm solves the problem:
νji (a, x, iE ;w, r) = max
k≥0
yi(ki, x, w)− rk − ϕ (41)
where ϕ =
[
iE
(
w +
(
1 + λjqA − ψ
)
qE
)
+ (1− iE) (w + bE)
] [ (1−α)xikα
iE(w+(1+λjqA−ψ)qE)+(1−iE)(w+bE)
] 1
1−γ
denotes the labor cost.
Substituting nji into proﬁts ν
j
i gives
νj
∗
i (a, x, iE ;w, r) = (1− γ)(xk)
α
1−γ
[
γ
iE (w + (1 + λjqA − ψ) qE) + (1− iE) (w + bE)
] γ
1−γ
(42)
kj
∗
i (x,w, r) =
[
x
(
γ
iE (w + (1 + λjqA − ψ) qE) + (1− iE) (w + bE)
)γ (α
r
)1−γ] 11−α−γ
(43)
From equation (5), the manager's proﬁt at the optimal level of capital is:
νji (k
j∗
i , x, w) = xk
α
[
γxik∗αi
iE(w+(1+λjqA−ψ)cE)+(1−iE)(w+bE)
] γ
1−γ −
[
iE
(
w +
(
1 + λjqA − ψ
)
qE
)
+ (1− iE) (w + bE)
]
n(k∗, x, w)− rk∗
The manager's consumption is determined as follows.
c+ a′ + (1− iHIφ)m+ p˜i ≤ (1 + r)a+ νi(k∗, x, w)− Tax+ TSI + τsiEpiE (44)
where
p˜i =

piE i
′
HI = 1, iE = 1
piP (m) i
′
HI = 1, iE = 0
0 i′HI = 0
(45)
TSI = max {0, c + Tax+ p˜i − τsiEpiE + (1− iHIφ)m+ (1 + r)(k − a)− υi(k∗, x, w)} (46)
a′ ≥ −a¯. (47)
l ≤ (1−∆)νi(a, x, w) + rk
∗
1 + r
− oop (48)
Note p˜i is the amount that the manager pays for insurance, i′HI is the entrepreneur's choice to
buy health insurance for himself for next period, and iE is the shock (whether the employer
must provide insurance to employee). The government subsidizes EHI purchases with τsiEpiE .
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Equation (48) is a credit constraint for the ﬁrm, where oop is the out-of-pocket health shock of
the entrepreneur and is deﬁned as
oop = (1− iHIφ(m))m. (49)
Notice νi(a,x,w)+(1+r)k
∗
1+r works as collateral, which yields the present value of the ﬁrm's earning net
of labor cost. We assume that there is a proportional cost of borrowing, which is represented by
(1−∆). This constraint introduces interesting dynamics as the entrepreneur's health insurance
decision will aﬀect its future available credit.
Constrained ﬁrm When managers do not have enough funds to operate the ﬁrm, they can
borrow from the capital market at the risk free rate r, up to a limit of l¯. If the optimal level of
capital k∗ can be ﬁnanced by borrowing, then the ﬁrm's problem will be similar to the uncon-
strained one.
When managers are credit constrained, namely a + l¯ < k∗, the ﬁrm will operate at the
capital level of a+ l¯. Borrowing limit l¯ is endogenous, see equation (48). Accordingly, the credit
constrained ﬁrms have borrowing that is determined by the equation as follows.
ν˜j
∗
(k˜, x, w) = xk˜αn˜γ − iE
(
w +
(
1 + λjqA − ψ
)
qE
)
n˜+ (1− iE) (w + bE)n˜− ra− (1 + r)l¯ (50)
where
k˜j = a+ l¯ = a+
ν˜∗(k˜, x, w) + ra+ (1 + r)l¯
(1 + r)
(1−∆)− oop (51)
n˜j
∗
(k˜, x, w) =
[
(1− α)xik˜α
iE (w + (1 + λjqA − ψ) qE) + (1− iE) (w + bE)
] 1
1−γ
. (52)
Hence the credit constrained ﬁrms diﬀer in their own capital holdings.
k˜j =
kj
∗
if a ≥ k∗ − ν˜∗(k˜,x,w)+ra+(1+r)l¯(1+r) (1−∆) + oop
a+ ν˜
∗(k˜∗,x,w)+(1+r)k˜∗
(1+r) (1−∆)− oop if a < k∗ − ν˜
∗(k˜,x,w)+ra+(1+r)l¯
(1+r) (1−∆) + oop
where k˜j
∗
is the solution to equation (50).
Proofs of propositions
The proof follows Antunes, Cavalcanti and Villamil (2008b).
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A.3 Computation
Given the values for parameters, and distribution Γ(x) for x, Ωz for z, Ωa for a, and Ωm for m,
the numerical algorithm works as follows.
1. Set a tolerance  > 0.
2. Guess Φ0 =
(
r0, w0, pi0E , pˆ
0
E , τ
0
y
)
. Solve for optimal household behavior:
f : (θ; Φ)→ (c, a′, i′HI , Ie, n, k) ,
where θ = {a, x, z,m, iE , iHI}. We will use the method of value function iteration as
follows.
(a) Guess value function V 0
(
θ; Φ0
)
and policy functions f0
(
θ; Φ0
)
.
(b) Update value and policy functions:
V 1
(
θ; Φ0
)
= max
a′,i′HI ,Ie
{IeVe + (1− Ie)Vw + βE [V 0 (θ′; Φ0)]}
f1
(
θ; Φ0
)
= arg maxV 1
(
θ; Φ0
)
(c) Stop if max
{∣∣V 1 − V 0∣∣ , ∣∣f1 − f0∣∣} ≤ . Otherwise, set V 0 = V 1, f0 = f1 and repeat
step (b).
(d) Set V ∗ = V 1, and f∗ = f1.
3. Generate a large number of individuals, N = 100000. For each agent j assign a vector of
initial condition
(
aj0, x
j
0, z
j
0,m
j
0, i
j
E,0, i
j
HI,0
)
, where xj0 ∼ Γ(x), zj0 ∈ Ωz, mj0 ∈ Ωm, ijHI = 0.
4. Simulate the economy for T periods, where T is suﬃciently large.
5. Calculate the following statistics from the simulated path
{
ajt , x
j
t , z
j
t ,m
j
t , i
j
E,t, i
j
HI,t, Ijw, Ije , nj , kj
}T
t=0
.
LS0 =
∑N
j=1
(
Ijw − Ijenj
)
N
KS0 =
∑N
j=1
(
aj − Ijekj
)
∑N
j=1 a
j
pi1E =
∑N
j=1
(
ijEi
j
HIm
j
)
∑N
j=1
(
ijEi
j
HI
)
pˆ1E =
∑N
j=1
(
IjepE(nj)nj
)
∑N
j=1
(
Ijenj
) .
40
and τ1y that balances the government's budget.
6. Stop and set (r∗, w∗, pi∗E , pˆ
∗
E) =
(
r0, w0, pi0E , pˆ
0
E
)
, if max
{
LS0,KS0,
∣∣pi1E − pi0E∣∣ , ∣∣pˆ1E − pˆ0E∣∣} ≤
. Otherwise, update aggregate variables (restart from step 2):
r0 = χr0 + (1− χ)ρKS0
w0 = χw0 + (1− χ)ρLS0
pi0E = χpi
0
E + (1− χ)pi1E
pˆ0E = χpˆ
0
E + (1− χ)pˆ1E
τ0y = χτ
0
y + (1− χ)τ1y
where χ ∈ (0, 1) is the step for updating aggregate variables.
A.4 Robustness checks: Administrative costs and no ﬁnancial frictions
In this section show that the results are robust to changes in the administrative cost function
for health insurance and ﬁnancial market frictions. First consider changes in administrative cost
function g(n). In the baseline calibration g(n) is concave, consistent with U.S. data in Fact 3.
The robustness exercise in the table changes the form of this function to two ﬁxed costs: g(n) is
6% and 13.2%. We chose these values based on data in SBA (2011), which is used to construct
administrative costs estimates of 13.2% for U.S. ﬁrms with 25-99 employees and the lowest cost
is 6% for the largest ﬁrms with more than 1000 employees. We repeat the two policy experiments
using these alternative costs, ceteris paribus.
Table 6: Robustness checks
g(n) = 0.06 g(n) = 0.132 no r_wedge
Statistics Base EHI exp no EHI Base EHI exp no EHI Base EHI exp no EHI
K/Y 2.411 2.400 2.430 2.405 2.400 2.430 3.39 3.407 3.43
real r (%) 4.372 4.415 4.304 4.394 4.413 4.305 3.465 3.43 3.344
Aggregate output 100 99.71 100.38 100 99.87 100.52 100 100.21 100.53
Insurance take-up 74.91 99.98 23.17 75.2 99.98 23.185 74.6 99.98 11.44
Entrepreneur % 5.466 5.755 4.927 5.576 5.761 4.927 5.18 5.262 4.808
Ave x 100 98.66 102.5 100 99.16 103.05 100 99.66 101.94
Ave ﬁrm size 100 94.66 111.55 100 96.58 113.93 100 98.33 108.01
% at c¯ 2.72 0.964 8.42 2.701 0.966 8.419 5.112 1.784 13.225
Welfare 0.275 1.506 -0.02 1.944 -0.779 3.42
% with CEV>0 77.56 90.1 46.37 92.44 1.013 96.245
tax/earn % 1.215 3.371 1.216 3.371 1.2912 4.0976
We ﬁnd that the results are robust to these cost changes. The table shows that a signiﬁcant
welfare loss remains when we vary the cost function. Under the indemnity policy, the welfare
gain is 2.28 in the U.S. baseline (with a concave cost function). Under the two alternative ﬁxed
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costs welfare is 1.51 when g(n) is 6% and 1.94 when g(n) is 13.2%. Thus, changing g(n) to
constant costs that correspond to a low and the lowest empirical costs, leads to welfare cost of
misallocation that remains non-trivial and positive. Similarly, in the EHI expansion policy the
baseline welfare cost was  0.61. When we vary the costs as explained we get 0.28 when g(n) is
6% and  0.02 when g(n) is 13.2%, which remain small.
In the table no r wedge corresponds to no capital market distortion. Again under the
indemnity policy the the welfare gain is 2.28 in the U.S. baseline, and it remains positive at
3.42. Similarly, in the EHI expansion policy the baseline welfare cost was  0.61 and it is 
0.78. Herranz, Krasa and Villamil (2015) ﬁnd that credit constraints are important in a dynamic
model of entrepreneurship with heterogeneity, and we conduct this robustness check in order to
isolate the eﬀects of health insurance from credit constraints.
Note that the persistence of health care shocks would aﬀect our results. Buera and Shin (2011)
study the welfare cost of incomplete markets in an economy with persistent entrepreneurial risk.
They show that more persistent shocks leads to a larger welfare loss due to missing consumption
insurance. However, it gives entrepreneurs more time to save and ﬁnance a proﬁtable project,
and hence reduces the welfare cost of market incompleteness. In our framework the eﬀect of a
more persistent managerial shock depends on the correlation between entrepreneurial risk and
the health shock. If the shocks are positively correlated, talented people tend to be healthier
and more persistent entrepreneurial risk makes misallocation less likely. A highly talented but
healthy (in the current period) agent knows that he will likely have similar entrepreneurial ability
and a favorable health shock in the future. The incentive to get insurance by becoming a worker
falls with the persistence of the entrepreneurial shock. On the contrary, if these two shocks are
negatively correlated, the misallocation problem will be more severe.
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